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Rights-based Theories of Accident Law
Gregory J. Hall

Introduction
No extant theory of accident law adequately addresses a central
normative concern in accidents: What criteria should determine the amount
of precaution an individual must employ to avoid being justifiably assigned
others’ costs from an accident?
The central normative concern is central in assigning accident costs for
at least two reasons. First, disputes about who should bear the costs of
accidents often hinge on determinations of the amount of precaution one or
more individuals should have taken in the acts that led to the accident.
Second, from the perspective of a person interested in not having to pay for
the accident costs others incur, that person wants to know at least the
minimum amount of precaution that she should employ to avoid having to
justifiably bear others’ accident costs.1 In short, she wants to know how
careful she should be to avoid being (successfully and justifiably) sued.
For example, much controversy exists over whether drivers should be
phoning while driving. Suppose Eman is phoning while driving when he
and Woomin accidentally collide. Woomin was driving as well but was not
phoning or breaking any traffic laws or doing anything else that would
increase the dangerousness of driving. The accident seems like it would not
have occurred if Eman had not been phoning while driving. Both Eman and
Woomin suffer bodily injury and property damage to their vehicles.
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1
This concern could be only a descriptive concern about what actual courts are likely to
do, but I am assuming the person is also concerned what should be done at least so that she
has some argument to defend herself in court and because she wants the law to be morally
justifiable.
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If Woomin seeks compensation for her accident costs from Eman and he
disputes his responsibility for her costs, resolution of the dispute may hinge
on whether Eman employed too little precaution by phoning while driving.
For the future, Eman and other drivers have an interest in knowing whether
phoning while driving employs too little precaution such that they should be
assigned the costs of others if an accident results.
Despite the importance of the central normative concern, social-utilitybased theories of accident law and rights-based theories of accident law do
not adequately address this concern in different ways.2 Social-utility-based
theories of accident law state the criteria that they endorse for the central
normative concern but fail to adequately justify the criteria. In particular,
theories that employ efficiency or some form of cost-benefit reasoning to
assess accident law seem to think that it is obvious why their criterion is the
proper one to use.3 Thus, they provide little to no justification for their
criterion’s application to assigning accident costs. Other social-utilitybased theories such as the theory advocated by Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell use social welfare as the metric for assigning accident costs.4 Even
though the theory tries to justify social welfare as opposed to fairness as the
criterion to assign accident costs, the theory does not defend a particular
way to weight the components of social welfare.5 Without particular
weights, social welfare analysis does not provide a determinate theory for
assigning accident costs.6
While social-utility-based theories do not adequately justify their
criteria for assigning accident costs, rights-based theories of accident law
have different shortcomings. However, the shortcomings of rights-based
theories have not received much attention.7 The project for this article is to
uncover these shortcomings to clear the way for a new theory of assigning
accident costs, a theory that has a robust justificatory basis.
2

Steven Hetcher makes a similar point but phrases it in terms of these theorists ignoring
the significance of the jury’s role in tort law. Steven Hetcher, The Jury's Out: Social
Norms' Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 633-36 (2003).
3
WILLIAM M. LANDES AND RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW (1987). GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
4
LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 3 (2002).
5
Daniel Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity? 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1791, 1793 (2003).
6
Ultimately I find the social-utility-based approach unsatisfying because it cannot
account for John Rawls’s idea of the separateness of persons, certain interests of a person
should not be sacrificed for the benefit of society. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 2627 (1971).
7
See LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 91-93 (2002).
They are some of the most vocal critics of how rights-based theories fail to address the
central normative concern.
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Broadly stated, the shortcoming of rights-based theories is that these
theories barely address the central normative concern—What criteria should
determine the amount of precaution an individual must employ to avoid
being justifiably assigned others’ costs from an accident?8 Such an
omission is puzzling because rights-based theories address many other
components of extant tort law’s doctrine and institutional structure. These
theories usually cover the central normative concern by endorsing the
reasonable person standard.9 However, rarely do these theories provide
criteria to determine what the reasonable person standard requires in
specific situations.10 Even when they provide some content to the
reasonable person standard by appeals to intuition, convention, or usual
practices, they do not provide a justification for using such content to assign
accident costs.11

8

Some theorists are an exception to this claim because they advocate for some form of
social tort insurance. See David H. Blankfein Tabachnick and Kevin A. Kordana, On
Belling the Cat: Rawls & Tort as Corrective Justice, 92 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1279
(2006); Ronen Avraham and Issa Kohler Housmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians, 12
LEGAL THEORY 181 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss,
in David Owen, ed., PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387 (1995); Marc A.
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement,
53 VA. L. REV. 774, 808–814 (1967); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law,
73 CAL. L. REV. 555 (1985); Larry A. Alexander, Causation and Corrective Justice: Does
Tort Law Make Sense? 6 LAW & PHIL. 1–23 (1987); Christopher Schroeder, Corrective
Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439 (1990). I exclude these
theorists from my present considerations because I am assuming that accident costs from at
least some acts should be borne only by the individuals involved in the accident rather than
by society as a whole.
9
I have in mind primarily Ernest Weinrib. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE
LAW 147-52 (1995). Arthur Ripstein is also an example of such a theorist even though he
adds some further criteria. Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of
Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2004). Benjamin Zipursky and Jules Coleman are
examples although it is not clear that they are engaged in normative (as opposed to
descriptive) tort theory. Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91
GEORGETOWN L. J. 695 (2003); JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992). Kaplow
and Shavell also note that it is unclear the extent to which tort theorists in the rights-based
tradition (my term) are engaged in descriptive theory or normative theory. Kaplow and
Shavell at 91-93.
10
George Fletcher is a notable exception to this generalization. George Fletcher,
Fairness and Utility in the Law of Torts, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972). Jody Kraus
emphasizes the importance of legal theory coming up with determinate answers to
particular cases. Jody Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1773 (2007).
11
Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 119 (Gerald Postema ed., 2001). JULES COLEMAN,
RISKS AND WRONGS (1992). However, doing so is not Coleman’s purpose.
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Returning to the example of phoning while driving, none of the rightsbased theories of assigning accident costs provide adequate answers to
whether phoning while driving employs too little precaution. Thus, these
theories do not provide adequate answers about how the costs from Eman
and Woomin’s accident should be assigned.
With such inadequacies, the rights-based approach to accident law has
(not surprisingly) lost much ground in legal academia to the social-utilitybased approach. By highlighting the inadequacies in extant rights-based
theories of accident law, I aim to show what issues a rights-based theory
must meet to advance a compelling alternative to the social-utility-based
approach.
After preliminaries, I sketch the reasonable person theory of assigning
accident costs. Although ambiguous, the reasonable person theory can be
interpreted as a rights-based theory. Due to its enigmatic and ambiguous
use of ‘reasonable,’ the reasonable person theory of assigning accident costs
cannot be relied on to answer the central normative concern. Next, I offer
Kantian political theory as a compelling paradigm to determine if any other
more developed rights-based theory of assigning accident costs is adequate
and persuasive. Once I demonstrate the particular shortcomings of each
extant rights-based theory, I briefly outline a democratic theory of assigning
accident costs that has a chance of adequately addressing the central
normative concern.

I. Preliminaries
Even though I focus on theories of tort law, I do not think the extant
institution of tort law is theoretically the most important place to examine
how we should assign the costs of accidents. Instead, I focus on tort law
(accident law in particular) because I think that by eliminating its
murkiness, we can address the central normative concern more clearly from
a non-institutional perspective.
This non-institutional perspective does not first explore, for example,
which decision-makers should decide how to assign accident costs. Since
some kinds of decision-makers (e.g. courts or insurance companies) may be
better at assigning accident costs depending on the requisite criteria, I
address the criteria identified in the central normative concern first.
Answering the central normative concern first may help us determine how
to shape the institution(s) to assign accident costs because institutional
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issues are likely partly dependent on the answer to the central normative
concern.12
By now, it may be apparent that I am interested in the normative
question of how to assign costs from accidental harm as opposed to
intentional harm. So, when I refer to tort law or tort theory, I am
exclusively referring to the aspects that govern accidental torts rather than
intentional torts. While we have an intuitive sense of what accidental harm
is, explicitly defining it is tricky.13 Stephen Perry provides a helpful
definition: unintentional (accidental) harm is “harm to which an agent
causally contributed but that he did not intend to bring about and that he
was not substantially certain would occur.”14
Several aspects of accidents and accident law are not my inquiry. I am
not addressing what constitutes causation of harm, what is the scope of
one’s duty to take care not to injure others, what types of harm should be
compensable, or how one should assess compensation for accidental harm.
Instead, I am only addressing what sorts of acts should be the bases for
compensation when these acts lead to accidental harm (i.e. the central
normative concern).

12

While extant tort law makes the bilateral relationship salient, other institutional
mechanisms could recognize the bilateral relationship. Even social tort insurance could
maintain a bilateral relationship by conditioning compensation on a showing of fault (such
as requiring the police officer on the scene to determine fault) and requiring the faulty party
to pay higher premiums going forward. Although the evidentiary burden would be less,
this kind of system would monetarily affect the parties to the accident in the same way as
the tort system (assuming liability insurance).
13
Comments e, d, and f in Restatement 2nd of Torts § 282 imply that that negligent torts
are all remaining torts after one has separated the intentional torts, the reckless torts, and
torts of strict liability. This provides a negative definition rather than a positive definition
of a negligent tort making it seem easier to say what negligence is not compared to saying
what negligence is. The Restatement uses negligence to mean “conduct which falls below
the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm.” Restat 2d of Torts, § 282.
14
Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS (Gerald Postema ed., 2001). This definition can be
made more precise because, as it stands, Perry’s definition seems to include harm from an
intentional tort. The perpetrator of an intentional tort intends to cause harm to which the
victim also causally contributed. So, the definition could be made more precise though
also more cumbersome: accidental harm is harm to which an agent causally contributed but
that neither he nor one other causally-related person intended to bring about and that those
two were not substantially certain would occur. Note that harm can be accidental with
regard to one person while intentional with regard to another person. Also, accidental harm
could also extend to harm to which no agent causally contributed such as when lightning
strikes a tree in an undiscovered island. Tort law does not address this latter kind of case.
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II. The Reasonable Person Theory
Although reasonable person legal doctrine as found in United States tort
law can be ambiguous, one plausible interpretation conceives of it as a
rights-based theory. I begin with this rights-based reasonable person theory
to demonstrate that rights-based tort theories cannot rely on it to answer the
central normative concern. Additionally, unveiling the shortcomings of the
reasonable person theory demonstrates one inadequate rights-based theory
while simultaneously demonstrating the need to adequately answer the
central normative concern.
The reasonable person theory of assigning accident costs as found in
United States tort law is challenging to articulate because many judges
developed it over time through the common law. The reasonable person
theory has also been articulated or commented on in various ways by legal
theorists. In formulating the reasonable person theory, I am not trying to
synthesize all of these various sources or versions. Rather, by ‘reasonable
person theory’ I mean to outline the general way the extant accident law in
the United States common law approaches negligence as well as how it
distinguishes negligence from strict liability.15 To do so, I explicate the
Restatement 2nd of Torts because it attempts to synthesize the case law.
A. Ambiguities Uncovered
In analyzing the Restatement’s version of the reasonable person theory,
I aim to capture the extent to which judges and commentators have
formulated accident law doctrine.16 I say the ‘extent’ because I argue that
judges and commentators do not provide enough clear legal doctrine to
explain and justify particular decisions in accident cases.17 Also, it is
unclear whether one aspect of the Restatement 2nd of Torts reflects actual
judicial practice at the trial level. These shortcomings of the law, as
evidenced in the Restatement, are what I take to be the impetus for legal
theorists to try to explain and justify accident law in terms of a more robust
theory of the reasonable person, cost-benefit analysis, or reciprocity.
The reasonable person theory assigns the costs of an accident to the
individuals involved in the accident rather than to the community as a
15

Alongside the reasonable person theory to accident law exists the doctrine of strict
liability. Strict liability only applies to limited, specific kinds of acts—usually extraordinarily dangerous acts—which judges have carved out. I address strict liability later.
16
I ignore differences among the states concerning their tort doctrine because my focus is
on a characteristic that I believe the states all share.
17
Jody Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justification, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1773, 1775 (2007).
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whole.18 As the default, the reasonable person theory assigns each accident
cost to each person or group19 who incurred that cost.20 The reasonable
person theory allows a reassignment of the costs from the default
assignment if one of the parties to the accident can demonstrate that another
party acted negligently.21 Acting negligently means, according to this
theory, that the person acted unreasonably according to the objective
reasonable person standard (described below).22 If one or more parties
involved in an accident acted unreasonably, the reasonable person theory
deems that person or persons at fault for the accident. For only one at fault
party, the costs of the other parties to the accident may be reassigned to the
at fault party. If more than one party is at fault, the costs of the accident
may be reassigned either jointly or in proportion to their degree of fault
(unreasonableness).23
To illustrate, recall the accident between Woomin and Eman resulting
from Eman’s phoning while driving. If Woomin chooses, the reasonable
person theory allows her to instigate a legal action to get Eman to pay
certain of her costs from the accident, if she can demonstrate that Eman
acted unreasonably.24 If Eman acted unreasonably by phoning while

18

Christopher Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 439, 439 (1990).
19
One group could be a government, but the reasonable person theory is treating the
government like a person rather than as a mechanism to spread the costs to members of
society.
20
Restat 2d of Torts, § 281. What counts as an individual incurring a cost is the damage
to his property, injury to his body, economic losses based on what the person would have
gained without the accident, and other losses that setback a person’s interests.
Traditionally, economic losses that do not result from a physical injury to the person’s
property or body are still losses to the person but are not compensable losses in tort
doctrine.
21
The reasonable person theory was developed by judges in the context of tort law
adjudications although nothing about the approach prohibits it from being used in other
institutional settings. Since judges developed the reasonable person theory in an
adversarial legal system, the individual seeking compensation from another must prove that
the other person was at fault for the accident while the alleged faulty party must defend
herself to avoid receiving a judgment requiring her to compensate the individual seeking
compensation.
22
Restat 2d of Torts, § 283.
23
Which of these two options is available in an accident case depends on the particular
way the courts in each state have developed this aspect of tort doctrine.
24
Who else is involved in the accident has often been interpreted broadly to include
individuals who were not present during the accident but had some tie to the accident such
as employers whose employees were involved in the accident and producers of a product
involved in an accident. The potential candidates to bear the costs of the accident, while
broad, has not been expanded to society as a whole in U.S. tort law.

8

Rights-based Theories of Accident Law

driving, the reasonable person theory would reassign Woomin’s accident
costs to him.
As stated above, the reasonable person theory defines its species of fault
according to the objective reasonable person standard. To sketch the
objective reasonable person standard, I rely on the Restatement 2nd of Torts.
The words “reasonable man” denote a person exercising those
qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which
society requires of its members for the protection of their own
interests and the interests of others.25
While the Restatement’s denotation of the concept of reasonable person
indicates the categories of qualities that are important to the concept and the
purpose of the concept, it does not tell us exactly what those qualities are
for specific situations. For instance, would the reasonable person phone
while driving? Would phoning impede too much her attention and perhaps
judgment while driving? Not listing the specific qualities for each category
needed under what conditions is understandable due to the variety of acts
individuals can undertake, the complex ways acts can intersect, rule of law
principles, and the limits of human foresight. Due in part to these
considerations, judges developed the reasonable person theory in the form
of a standard rather than a more precise rule or list of rules.
The Restatement does state that these categories of qualities (attention,
knowledge, intelligence, and judgment) are filled out by what ‘society
requires of its members.’ However, two problems arise with this societyphrase. First, it is not clear how this society-phrase is a restatement of tort
law at the trial court level.26 Jury instructions do not explicitly instruct
jurors to decide what ‘society requires of its members;’ jury instructions
simply ask jurors to determine what a reasonable person would have done
in the defendant’s situation.27 If we ignore the society-phrase in the
Restatement because it is not used in jury instructions, we have even less
25

Restat 2d of Torts, § 283. Note that the Restatement 2nd uses the sex-specific term
‘man’ when it seems to mean ‘person’ which is why I rename the test. “The fact that this
judgment is personified in a "man" calls attention to the necessity of taking into account the
fallibility of human beings.” Restat 2d of Torts, § 283. I do not mean to preclude the
feminist critique that the standard has been a male standard. By using ‘reasonable person’
instead, I attempt to use a sex-neutral standard consistent with the other language that the
Restatement 2nd uses.
26
Some appellate decisions have phrased the reasonable person standard in terms of the
“community ideal of reasonable behavior.”26 However, it is not clear whether the court is
merely rehashing the Restatement 2nd of Torts or whether the court is providing clarity and
direction to trial courts.
27
This claim is based on a survey of many states model jury instructions for negligence
cases. See document on file with the author.
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guidance about what should flesh out the reasonable person standard.
Getting from reasonable person jury instructions to a notion that the
objective reasonable person standard should be filled out by what ‘society
requires of its members’ requires a few steps of reasoning that are not
provided by jurists or commentators.
The second problem is that, even if we retain the Restatement’s added
phrase, we still cannot adequately flesh out the reasonable person standard.
To determine precisely what ‘society requires of its members,’ ambiguities
need clarifying. What ‘society requires of its members’ is ambiguous in at
least two ways. The phrase does not spell out what constitutes the relevant
‘society.’ Is it the neighborhood, the town, the county, the nation-state, a
region of nation-states, the hemisphere, the world?
The other ambiguity concerns the nature of the society’s requirement.
The use of society doing the requiring is murky from the outset because it is
a personification of society. Determining what ‘society requires’ at least
involves some sense of how individuals’ actions (including their beliefs)
combine together into an action of ‘society requiring.’
Setting the personification issue largely aside, another ambiguity
involves two possible interpretations of what ‘society requires of its
members.’ The society-phrase could refer to the demands of morality.
Under that interpretation, society is a shorthand way of expressing the
objectively correct moral point of view. With this interpretation inserted
explicitly into the text, the Restatement would read:
The words "reasonable man" denote a person exercising those
qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which
morality requires of individuals for the protection of their own
interests and the interests of others.28
Indeed, the further qualification that the ‘reasonable person’ standard be
objective29 favors this moral interpretation because the moral point of view
is often associated with an objective point of view.30
Another interpretation of what ‘society requires of its members’ could
be what are the actual social norms or conventions (conventions, for short)
of a particular society. These conventions could be codified in bodies of
laws or regulations. For example, when driving the reasonable person may
28

Restat 2d of Torts, § 283 modified as indicated in italics.
Restat 2d of Torts, § 283.
30
David Hume, John Locke, and John Rawls all use constructs that abstract from
subjective knowledge to argue for the correct view of moral claims. DAVID HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 580 (1888). JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON
GOVERNMENT 189 (1821). JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).
29
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follow all traffic regulations. The norms could also remain informal
without explicit validation by any part of the government. An example of a
possible convention is, As soon as possible, clean up a spill that causes
slippery conditions on a surface (which you own) that people often traverse.
The convention-based interpretation of the reasonable person standard
may seem to follow more directly from the Restatement’s text than the
morality-based interpretation because a social group (society) is doing the
requiring. However, once again, the convention-based interpretation does
not obviously comport with jury instructions in trial courts, where the
Restatement’s phrase ‘what society requires of its members’ is not used.
Jurors are only instructed to determine what the reasonable person would
have done without disambiguating whether they are being asked for an
answer based on morality or an answer based on facts about the conventions
of their society.31
The rest of the text of the Restatement does not resolve the ambiguities
identified above. The Restatement adds to its denotation of ‘reasonable
man’ what it conceives of as the “standard of the reasonable man.”
Standard of the "reasonable man." Negligence is a departure from a
standard of conduct demanded by the community for the protection
of others against unreasonable risk.32
31

See model jury instructions for the states. For example, here is an example of jury
instruction from Vermont adapted to the case of Woomin and Eman: Woomin claims that
Eman was negligent in phoning while driving. Eman was negligent if he was not
reasonably careful in phoning while driving. That does not mean that Eman had to use the
greatest possible care, like an unusually cautious person. Rather, he had to exercise the
same care a reasonable person would have done in her same circumstances, taking into
account the foreseeable risk of injury caused by her actions. Not every injury is caused by
negligence; sometimes accidents happen even when people act reasonably. Vermont Civil
Jury Instruction Committee, Negligence, http://www.vtbar.org/Upload%20Files/WebPages/
Attorney%20Resources/juryinstructions/civiljuryinstructions/Negligence.htm accessed on
January 5, 2011.
Note that the jury is not asked to determine if the defendant had reasons to do what she
did. That would be a question of whether the defendant acted rationally rather than
reasonably—to put it in Rawlsian terms. Instead, the jury is asked to determine if the
person behaved reasonably, but they are not told what reasonable means in the particular
context that the defendant was in. That is the question they are to answer without further
guidance.
32
Restat 2d of Torts, § 283. Here the Restatement seems to equate negligence with the
standard of the reasonable person. While the statement about negligence is a fair
characterization, putting that sentence just after the phrase ‘standard of the reasonable man’
is misleading because the ‘standard of conduct demanded by the community’ (as
recognized in extant tort law) is higher, lower, or more specific than the pure reasonable
person standard when the age, technical knowledge, or the agent’s choices are factored into
the standard of conduct.
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The use of ‘community’ here instead of ‘society’ suggests that the relevant
group is smaller than the whole world and consists of a group with some
commonality. However, the text does not explicitly define its previous use
of ‘society’ in terms of community. Thus, if the two phrases indicate two
different relevant groups, the Restatement contradicts itself.
Even if we interpret ‘community’ as superseding or coextensive with
the Restatement’s use of ‘society’ as the relevant group, the neighborhood,
the town, the county, the state, the nation-state, and even groups not
exclusively within a political or geographical boundary remain viable
candidates for what constitutes the community. Hence, the ambiguity
regarding the scope of the community that does the ‘requiring’ or the
‘demanding’ remains.
Assuming that ‘community’ is what the Restatement means, the use of
‘community’ may seem to resolve the ambiguity concerning whether
morality or conventions fill out the reasonable person standard.
‘Community’ suggests something less than the moral point of view,
something particularized to a specific group of people. If so, then what the
community requires (or demands) is adherence to its norms and conventions
rather than adherence to the requirements of morality.
While drawing this implication from the use of ‘community’ may push
us toward the convention-based interpretation, the implication does not
necessarily follow. ‘Community’ could be a term indicating the moral point
of view because the community could require that its citizens follow the
requirements of morality. Moreover, the next part of the text pushes us
towards the morality-based interpretation. It reads as follows:
The standard which the community demands must be an objective
and external one, rather than that of the individual judgment, good
or bad, of the particular individual. It must be the same for all
persons, since the law can have no favorites…33
Stating that the standard that the community demands must be objective
suggests the moral point of view, as mentioned above. Norms and
conventions may not be objective but may rather be the subjective beliefs or
preferences of all or part of the individuals in the community. Furthermore,
stating that the standard must be external also suggests the moral point of
view because such would be external to the community’s norms and
conventions.
The rather-than-phrase could mean that the standard is objective and
external only relative to any particular individual in the community instead
33

Restat 2d of Torts, § 283.
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of objective and external to the whole community. However, the moralitybased interpretation would also be objective and external relative to any
particular individual. So, both interpretations are still possible.
The since-phrase may push us towards the morality-based interpretation.
By stating that the standard must be the same for “all persons,” it suggests
the moral point of view because the requirements of morality are usually the
same for all persons. In contrast, community norms and conventions vary
between communities. However, “all persons” could be all persons in the
community. So, both interpretations remain viable.
Importantly, the text does not justify why either the morality-based
interpretation or the convention-based interpretation should be decisive in a
legal action.34 Besides not informing us why the reasonable person theory
is justified, this lack of justification perpetuates the ambiguity in the
reasonable person theory between the morality-based interpretation and the
convention-based interpretation of what the community demands.
Another piece of the Restatement further exacerbates this ambiguity.
Weighing interests. The judgment which is necessary to decide
whether the risk so realized is unreasonable, is that which is
necessary to determine whether the magnitude of the risk outweighs
the value which the law attaches to the conduct which involves it.35
This comment appears to be offering a third way, often called the Learned
Hand test, to determine whether an actor is reasonable. Some claim that
weighing interests according to the Learned Hand test is exactly what a
reasonable person would do.36 However, weighing interests to gauge
whether “the magnitude of the risk outweighs the value which the law
attaches to the conduct” may not always be the same as doing what the
community demands of its citizens (at least under the convention-based
interpretation). For example, the community may not demand that citizens
avoid phoning while driving even though the magnitude of the risk of an
accident may outweigh the value of phoning while driving. At least, the
Restatement does not state that what the community demands of its citizens
is determined by this weighing of interests. Thus, the weighing-interests-

34

Particular judicial opinions may offer some justification. But, since the Restatement
does not mention these, I take it that the reasonable person theory has not affirmed a
particular interpretation.
35
Restat 2d of Torts, § 283.
36
Posner initially made this claim. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 THE
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 29, 32-34 (1972).
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based interpretation of the reasonable person standard can conflict with the
convention-based interpretation.37
The weighing-interests-based interpretation could be a clarification of
the morality-based interpretation of what a community demands of its
members. It seems to capture the law and economics approach to
negligence, which endorses a morality-based version of the Learned Hand
test.38
On the other hand, since this connection is not done explicitly, we are
left with the ambiguity because the weighing-interests-based interpretation
is not the only morality-based interpretation available to instantiate the
morality-based interpretation of the reasonable person standard. Other
possible morality-based interpretations include intuitionism, pragmatism,
and rights-based theories. While all of these moral theories may agree on
what the reasonable person would have done in some cases, in other cases
the theories come up with different answers.39 So, merely identifying one
morality-based interpretation without tying it to what the community
demands does not resolve the ambiguity of what constitutes the objective
reasonable person standard.
To be clear, I am not denying that one theory could unite the seemingly
incongruous parts of the Restatement such that the reasonable person theory
would offer determinate answers on how to assign accident costs. The law
and economics approach seems to do just that. What I am claiming is that
the reasonable person theory as developed in the common law and
articulated in the Restatement does not by itself provide determinate
answers on how to assign accident costs in many cases. In other words, as
far as I can tell, the ambiguities I identified above in the phrase ‘what
society requires of its members’ are not resolved in the reasonable person
theory as developed in the common law. The phrase remains ambiguous
relying on the decision-maker (e.g. judge or jury) to adopt (intentionally or
unintentionally) one version of the ambiguities.

37

In the Ford Pinto case and other similar cases not only do juries find companies who
weigh interests in the Learned Hand test style negligent and liable for the costs of the
accident, but juries also attach punitive damages on top of the costs of the accidents. This
suggests that Learned Hand test reasoning, at least in some cases, does not equate with the
jurors’ understanding of reasonableness at all. Instead, Learned Hand test reasoning may
equate with recklessness worthy of punishment. W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis:
A Reckless Act? 52 STAN. L. REV. 547 (1999-2000).
38
Kenneth W. Simmons, Tort Negligence, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Tradeoffs: A Closer
Look at the Controversy, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1171, 1172-73 (2008).
39
Simmons at 1173-80.
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B. Strict Liability Separated
The reasonable person theory (negligence) could be used to assign the
costs from all accidents. However, judges separately developed strict
liability, a standard of care for narrow kinds of acts that the judges
identified.40 Judges have applied strict liability to accidents resulting from
livestock or abnormally dangerous animals that individuals maintain on
their property. Another category judges have applied strict liability to is
abnormally dangerous acts. This category of strict liability is laid out in the
Restatement as follows:
One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting
from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to
prevent the harm.
Strict liability is strict because the agent doing the abnormally dangerous act
is subject to liability even if the agent met the objective reasonable person
standard and even if the agent met a seemingly stricter standard of
exercising the “utmost care to prevent the harm.” So, having caused a
foreseeable harm via an abnormally dangerous act is usually enough to
establish liability for accident costs whereas with negligence (reasonable
person theory) causation alone is necessary but not sufficient to establish
liability.41
Strict liability could be used to assign the costs of all accidents as long
as the person seeking compensation can prove that another person “caused”
the accident.42 Richard Epstein has espoused such a theory.43 Common law
judges did not go this route choosing instead to use the reasonable person
theory in one domain and to use the strict liability approach in other limited
domains. Keeping these domains separate is entrenched in the common
law. However, common law judges have not provided a deep theoretical

40

This description is not meant to be a historical description, nor does it take a position
on the issue of whether strict liability was formerly applied ubiquitously and negligence
added later.
41
Strict liability is not absolute liability because some qualifications can absolve one of
liability. See for example, Restat 2d of Torts, § 519, Comment on Subsection (2)e; Madsen
v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 101 Utah 552; 125 P.2d 794; 1942 Utah LEXIS 24 (1942) (where
defendant was not held strictly liable because the type of harm that occurred to the
neighboring mink farm was not foreseeable breaking the legal causal link).
42
Perry argues that cause in such a theory must have some normative component to it.
Stephen R. Perry, Libertarianism, Entitlement, and Responsibility, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
351, 381 (1997).
43
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973).
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justification for the division between negligence (reasonable person theory)
and strict liability.44
The lack of a theoretical justification for the division between strict
liability and negligence (reasonable person theory) make the judicial answer
to the central normative concern murky. Along with the ambiguities within
the reasonable person theory identified above, the murkiness of accident
law is severe. Unsatisfied with this murkiness, theorists have tried to flesh
out what the objective reasonable person standard requires. Before we can
evaluate these attempts to flesh out the reasonable person standard, we need
a criterion to evaluate whether these attempts are successful. In the next
section, I outline such a criterion.
III. Kantian Normative Political Theory
As I stated at the outset, the social-utility-based approach and the rightsbased approach dominate the theory of assigning accident costs. While
social utility theories fail to adequately defend their criteria, I am not taking
issue with the social-utility-based approach in this article. Instead, I am
focusing on two problems with extant rights-based theories. First, rightsbased theories fail to provide complete, determinate criteria for assigning
accident costs. I have already shown that the reasonable person theory is
riddled with this problem. Second, even those who provide some criteria
for assigning accident costs fail to adequately justify those criteria. To
make salient these two problems, I provide Kantian political theory through
which we may evaluate these theories of assigning accident costs.
I recommend Kantian political theory because rights-based theories of
assigning accident costs often claim to be based on this major branch of
normative liberal political theory. The branch includes John Locke, Jean
Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, and John
Rawls. I focus on a distinctly Rawlsian version of this branch. Although I
do not have space to defend the persuasiveness of this branch of political
theory, I take it that the persuasiveness of Kantian normative liberal
political theory (Kantian political theory, for short) is evident based on its
prominence in political theory literature and in the forthcoming arguments.
A foundational element of Kantian political theory is the concept of the
free and equal person. Determining the requirements of Kantian political
theory involves reasoning about what kind of society treats persons with

44

Some tort theorists have tried to reconcile or justify the division between negligence
and strict liability.
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equal concern.45 Another way to state this form of reasoning is by
considering what kind of society free and equal persons would choose given
limitations about what can bias their choices.46 The outcome of the most
persuasive reasoning from the basis of free and equal persons provides the
structure of the political society required by morality according to Kantian
political theory.
Based on Rawls’s work, the free and equal person would choose the
kind of society where she could develop her most valued capacities.47 One
of these capacities is her ability to develop, revise, and pursue her own life
plan; this capacity reflects her value of being free.48 The free and equal
person does not want to pursue her life plan regardless of how it affects
other people. Instead, she values her capacity to cooperate with other
people based on fair terms of social cooperation; this capacity reflects her
value of being equal.49 Another part of being equal means that a free and
equal person does not make choices that discriminate against persons based
on morally arbitrary characteristics such as their gender, wealth of their
society, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or place in history.50 Putting these
together, the free and equal person would choose a kind of society where
each individual can pursue each individual’s own life plan according to fair
terms of cooperation that do not discriminate against persons based on
morally arbitrary characteristics. Determining what fair terms the free and
equal person would choose provides the structure of the political society
required by Kantian political theory.
As fair terms, the free and equal person would choose a normative
division between the domain of the individual and the domain of the
social.51 This normative division provides the individual space to pursue
her life plan while making sure other individuals are also able to pursue

45

This formulation is based off of Ronald Dworkin’s writings. RONALD DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 1 (2000).
46
This formulation is based off of John Rawls’s writings. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 14-15 (2001). For my purpose, reasoning in either of the
Rawlsian way or the Dworkinian way at this level of abstraction seems to lead to the same
conclusions. So, I do not address any possible differences between these formulations of
Kantian political theory.
47
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 18-19 (1993).
48
Id. at 30-31.
49
Id. at 19.
50
These are some of the restraints on what free and equal individuals may choose as fair
terms based on Rawls’s construct of the veil of ignorance. Id. at 304-309.
51
This claim is normative; it does not deny that the social shapes the individual as
feminists have pointed out. Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in FEMINIST
REVOLUTION 204 (1979).
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their life plans on fair terms.52 The domain of the individual is the domain
of permissible actions, as a matter of political justice, that individuals may
do without having to take into consideration how those actions may affect
other individuals or society as a whole.53 For example, an individual should
be able to believe what she finds persuasive even if those beliefs are
unpopular or disappoint others. Allowing the individual to believe as she
wants facilitates her forming and affirming her own life plan. The domain
of the individual must be expansive enough to allow for a broad range of
life plans. Having an expansive domain of the individual where an
individual may permissibly form and pursue her life plan reflects the free
aspect of the free and equal person.54
Despite being free to pursue a life plan, an individual may not pursue
just any life plan. An individual may not permissibly pursue being a serial
murderer because it substantially interferes with other individuals pursuing
their life plans. Moreover, an individual may not pursue a permissible life
plan by impermissible means. An individual cannot permissibly secure, as
part of her life plan, home ownership by defrauding a seller of a home. To
establish and enforce the fair terms upon which individuals may pursue
their life plans, the free and equal person would choose to have in a political
structure a separate normative domain, the domain of the social.
The domain of the social includes what government can, cannot, and
must do with regard to persons as well as specifies what individuals can,
should not, and must do with regard to other individuals or the government.
For example, the government should not force someone to testify against
herself in a criminal trial. An individual should not take another person’s
bicycle without permission except perhaps in extreme situations. Choosing
a domain of social rules that govern the fair terms reflects the free and equal
person’s desire to be equal.
Putting these two parts together, the free and equal person would choose
a normative political division between what society (government or other
individuals) may do to a person and the individual’s claim to a domain of
her life where she is free from any requirements to do things for the
52

I am indebted to Arthur Ripstein for identifying the importance of this division for
assigning accident costs. Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of
Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2004).
53
I say ‘as a matter of political justice’ because I am only including those actions that
society or government should not require of its population. I mean to exclude those actions
that may be required by interpersonal morality because I am focusing on the relationship
between the individual and the society and the relationship between individuals qua
citizens of a coercive social structure.
54
Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1811 (2004).
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government or for other persons. We need not search for objections to this
normative division because I think most would agree that Kantian political
theory requires this kind of division.55 Theorists may disagree on the exact
contours of the social domain and the individual domain, but they
acknowledge the normative division in some form as part of Kantian
political theory.56
The normative domain of the society and the domain of the individual
do not merely determine what each respectively may and may not
permissibly do. The domains also include what the individual is
responsible for and what society is responsible for, as indicated by the
‘must’ in the above formulations. As part of the social domain, the
government creates the fair terms of social cooperation by doing such things
as forming laws and institutions, regulating transactions between
individuals, and providing public goods. By establishing the fair terms of
interactions, the government makes possible various life plans that
individuals may pursue within that structure. The structure also indicates to
individuals what their fair share of resources (including wealth) is and
allows them to plan their lives based on their expected fair share of
resources.
In the domain of the individual, the responsibility of each individual is
to create her determinate life plan based on what she can realistically expect
as her fair share of resources.57 In pursuing her life plan, the individual is
responsible for obeying the fair terms of cooperation that govern the
conditions in which she and others can pursue their determinate life plans.58
Kantian political theory provides a way to assess theories of assigning
accident costs. The most persuasive theory of assigning accident costs is
the one that free and equal persons would choose as part of the fair terms of
social cooperation. Such a theory would be the best interpretation of
Kantian political theory on the issue of assigning accident costs. In the next
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See for example, Arthur Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort,
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2004).
56
One can see an example of this kind of issue in the disagreement between Rawlsians
and G.A. Cohen regarding extent to which individual choices about their salary or their
occupation are subject to the demands of social justice. See G.A. COHEN, RESCUING
JUSTICE AND EQUALITY Chpts. 4-5 (2008).
57
John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 165169 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds., 1982). See Ripstein’s account of these ideas. Arthur
Ripstein, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811
(2004).
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section, I examine whether rights-based theories that are inspired by social
utility theory are good interpretations of Kantian political theory.
IV. Rights-based Versions of Social Utility Theories
A. Negligence as Narrow Utilitarianism
I start with a theory of negligence that is not obviously a rights-based
theory.
When properly distinguished from what I call ‘general
utilitarianism’ narrow utilitarianism can be construed as a rights-based
theory of negligence or, at least, a mixed theory. The narrow utilitarian
concept of negligence states that an actor is negligent if she did not employ
all cost-justified precautions in her act that led to the accident. Costjustified precautions are precautions that cost less than the cost of the
probable harms that could be avoided by the precaution. If an actor is
negligent, then she should be assigned the accident costs of the other parties
to the accident assuming that the other parties were not negligent. One way
to formulate narrow utilitarianism as a rights-based theory is:
Each person has a right to be compensated if harmed from another’s
act that failed to take all cost-justified precautions.
For example, to reduce the errors in surgery, medical providers could
write on the body of the patient with a marker indicating what is to be done
and what is not to be done. Suppose this precaution costs $100 per patient.
If employing this precaution of body writing avoided less than $100 worth
of harm taking into account the probability of such harm, then the
precaution would not be cost-justified. If the precaution could avoid more
than $100 of harm, then the precaution on surgery patients is cost justified.
Assuming body writing is cost justified, then a medical provider that did not
do it would be negligent and be assigned the costs of any resulting harm
from the misplaced surgery.
Narrow utilitarianism is a form of Learned Hand-style reasoning.59 The
law and economics paradigm often states this conception of negligence in
terms of a formula.60 A person is negligent when the burden of a possible
precaution (B) was less than (<) the probable loss (PL).61 A person is not
negligent if, for all relevant precautions, B>PL. If no party to an accident
was negligent in their act that led to the accident, then each party bears the
costs she incurred from the accident. Narrow utilitarianism does not
59

Other forms of Learned Hand-style reasoning reflect costs and benefits in other terms.
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 29, 32
(1972).
61
Id. at 32. Note that we are analyzing the ex ante choice. So, there is uncertainty where
the benefit or loss will occur and how much that benefit or loss will be.
60
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concern itself with the administration costs of the tort legal system in
determining negligence just like judges do not look at the cost of
adjudication in determining whether a particular speech act is protected by
the First Amendment. These administration costs are part of the cost of
government protecting the rights of individuals.
Narrow utilitarianism is narrow because it does not look beyond the
individuals involved, the kinds of actions they did, and their possible
precautions to determine who should bear the costs of the accident.62 A
wider approach ‘general utilitarianism’ would assign accident costs in
whatever way minimizes the sum of accident costs and administration costs
of dealing with the assignment of accident costs.63 Since general
utilitarianism aims to minimize accident costs and administration costs,
general utilitarianism is not constrained by requirements of direct causation
or outcome responsibility because administration costs for determining such
issues could be costly. To save administration costs of lengthy trials,
general utilitarianism could require assigning accident costs to all members
of society through social tort insurance. Another example is that general
utilitarianism could require assigning accident costs to individuals not
involved in certain accidents such as a third party who is the cheapest-costavoider of such accidents to incentivize similar third parties to intervene in
the future to prevent such accidents.64
Another reason narrow utilitarianism is not general utilitarianism relates
to the acts of the parties involved.65 The general utilitarian is not only
concerned with minimizing accident costs and administration of accident
costs, but she is also concerned with how much utility individuals are
producing by their acts.66 So, the general utilitarian would also evaluate
whether the individuals involved in the accident should have engaged in
entirely different acts rather than merely assessing whether the individuals
engaged in all cost-justified precautions for the kind of act they did.
62

Richard Posner’s claim about utilitarian or economic interpretation of negligence in
tort began as a descriptive claim. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 THE
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 29, 32-34 (1972). Posner thinks that courts have been using a
utilitarian-type economic analysis to determine whether or not an act is negligent. Posner
at 34. In contrast, I take the utilitarian form of negligence as normative.
63
Guido Calabresi, Neologisms Revisited, 64 MD. L. REV. 736, 743.
64
Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 85n21 (1975-1976).
65
Narrow utilitarianism may have a limited scope in other ways. It may not seek to
convert strict liability into the negligence standard. Neither need it seek to apply
utilitarianism in any other legal domain.
66
I am not claiming any theorist of accident law has espoused this view. Rather, this
view results from a whole scale commitment to utilitarianism.
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To illustrate, suppose two car drivers collide. The narrow utilitarian
would ask whether each driver took all cost justified precautions related to
driving in those circumstances to determine if either driver was negligent.
In contrast, the general utilitarian would also ask whether either driver
could have maximized utility by staying home, walking, taking public
transit, bicycling, moving closer to one’s regular destinations, and
numerous other alternatives to driving that day for that purpose. If so, then
the utilitarian could condemn as negligent one or both of these drivers even
if their driving considered alone involved all cost justified precautions
related to driving.
How the general utilitarian would assign accident costs from the
accident would depend on a number of factors. For example, did one or
both individuals maximize utility by driving in that instance for that
purpose? What other options were available to incentivize these individuals
and others to choose the act (possibly not driving at all) that would
maximize utility in the future? What institutional structure for assigning
accident costs maximizes the net utility of the individuals involved? The
general utilitarian could consider many other possible issues as they relate
to social utility.
To repeat for emphasis, the general utilitarian would assess whether the
actors should have engaged in entirely different actions rather than only the
more limited inquiry of whether the actors employed all cost justified
precautions. To my knowledge, this implication of general utilitarianism
has not been noted by accident law theorists. However, it follows directly
from the general utilitarian’s commitment to maximize social utility.
So far, I have merely stated what negligence is according to narrow
utilitarianism and contrasted it with (a non-rights-based theory) general
utilitarianism. As stated, narrow utilitarianism does not suffer from the first
problem with rights-based theories, the problem of offering incomplete
criteria for assigning accident costs. Ignoring measurement problems,
narrow utilitarianism provides clear enough criteria to assign accident costs.
Narrow utilitarianism, as a rights-based theory, struggles with the
second problem, justification. The most straightforward justification for
narrow utilitarianism might appear to be utilitarian moral theory
(utilitarianism, for short). 67 Put roughly, utilitarianism requires individuals
to maximize net social utility (happiness or something similar) because
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Narrow utilitarianism could be justified as a pragmatic approach to law. Richard
Posner may advocate such. See Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism To Offer Law?,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1663 (1990).
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utility is the highest human good. Utilitarianism is usually the justification
for general utilitarianism.
Since narrow utilitarianism conflicts with general utilitarianism, narrow
utilitarianism cannot be justified by the same justification as general
utilitarianism. Narrow utilitarianism does not assess whether individuals
involved in the accident maximized utility compared to other kinds of acts.
Also, narrow utilitarianism accepts the responsibility constraints of direct
causation and outcome responsibility. These responsibility constraints
prevent narrow utilitarianism from maximizing utility because it forecloses
alternative bearers of accident costs other than those involved in the
accident. Thus, narrow utilitarianism must find its justification from
somewhere other than utilitarian moral theory.
Another possible justification of narrow utilitarianism is Kantian
political theory. Narrow utilitarianism could embody what it means to treat
individuals as free and equal persons for assigning accident costs. Narrow
utilitarianism seems to treat others as free (in a moral sense) because it does
not require that individuals maximize utility in all of their acts (as general
utilitarianism does). So, narrow utilitarianism seems to allow expansive
space for individuals to pursue their life plans without having to twist their
life plans into the straightjacket of what best benefits society. This aspect
of narrow utilitarianism addresses the free aspect of Kantian political
theory.
Narrow utilitarianism seems to treat individuals as equals because it
does not evaluate the acts of individuals in terms of certain kinds of acts
that are better or worse pursuits. Instead, narrow utilitarianism only looks
at the costs of precautions for an act and compares them to the costs of
possible harms. On a per unit basis, a unit of precaution and a unit of harm
count the same for each individual and each act, making narrow
utilitarianism seem to treat each individual’s pursuits equally. By not
prejudging kinds of acts and by comparing acts based on units of cost that
are the same for everyone, narrow utilitarianism seems to reflect what it
means to treat everyone as equal in Kantian political theory.
In fact, I think, for the reasons stated above, narrow utilitarianism is a
plausible interpretation of Kantian political theory. To repeat from above,
the right would be, Each person has a right to be compensated if harmed
from another’s act that failed to take all cost-justified precautions. While
narrow utilitarianism is a plausible rights-based interpretation of Kantian
political morality, I do not think it is the best interpretation.
The first shortcoming is that narrow utilitarianism does not evaluate the
worth of the purpose of an act. Narrow utilitarianism is blind to the purpose
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of an act insofar as it only looks at the costs of precaution and the costs of
possible harm. Earlier I described this aspect of narrow utilitarianism as a
good attribute of the theory, an attribute that may satisfy the moral
requirement to treat persons as equals. However, the problem of not
including some evaluation of the purpose of the act is that the interests of
the potential harmed are not given equal weight. For instance, individuals
can be subjected to risks from acts that have trivial value (trivial acts, for
short). Since narrow utilitarianism exposes individuals to harm from trivial
acts without the possibility of compensation, narrow utilitarianism fails to
adequately treat those exposed to harm from trivial acts as equals.
Borrowing an example from Gregory Keating, consider an ambulance
driver who is rushing a critically ill patient to a hospital.68 The ambulance
driver is taking all cost justified precautions. Since the patient faces serious
disability or death without urgent hospital care, narrow utilitarianism
justifies that the ambulance driver can drive fast (up to a point) despite the
risk of harm posed to pedestrians and other motorists. In contrast, consider
a car full of beach enthusiasts rushing to the beach. The beach goers are
quite anxious to get to the beach for various reasons (important to the beach
goers) such as making it in time for the barbecue and catching the waves
before dark. The road to the beach has only a few other vehicles. Since the
beach enthusiasts have so much to lose by driving slower and the road has
few other vehicles, the driver of the beach enthusiasts is cost justified in
driving quite fast to the beach.
Suppose accidents occurred from the driving of both the ambulance and
the beach enthusiasts. Narrow utilitarianism would find the drivers not at
fault (negligent) because both drivers took all cost justified precautions.
This implication disturbs me. Since beach going is a form of leisure (for
most beach goers), traveling to the beach is not important enough to require
that individuals only take cost justified precautions.69 When engaged in
leisure acts, we would want individuals to take more precaution than what is
cost justified to reflect this evaluation of the act. At the same time, getting
the injured to the hospital is a highly valuable act. Putting these together,
even though both drivers took all cost justified precautions, we may
disagree with the narrow utilitarian by adjudging that the ambulance driver
was not at fault and that the beach driver was at fault. In so doing, the
ambulance driver would not be assigned the costs for her accident whereas
the beach driver would be assigned the costs for his accident.
68

Gregory Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STANFORD
L. REV. 311, 324-25 (1996).
69
Keating seems to mean something similar by stating beach-going is a “trivial end.”
Keating at 325.
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Free and equal persons would not want to be subject to risks just
because they are cost-justified. It is true that free and equal persons have
interests in pursuing their chosen acts and so would want wide latitude in
what acts they can pursue without being subject to bearing the costs of any
resulting accidents. However, free and equal persons do not want to be
subject to risks of harm for purposes that are not valuable enough (trivial
acts). Instead, we need a compromise between allowing an individual the
freedom to pursue the acts that she wants and the interests that those subject
to risk have of being free non-compensable harm from trivial acts.
The advocate of narrow utilitarianism may think that the value of the
purposes of the act can be factored into the test advocated by narrow
utilitarianism. While the value of the purposes of an act could be factored
into some equation to determine liability, that revised equation would no
longer be narrow utilitarianism as it is usually presented. Additionally, any
attempt to put the costs of bodily injury into a formula that weighs it
mathematically against other costs fails to capture that most individuals
would prefer no injury at all to having been injured and compensated.
Those who advocate narrow utilitarianism do not include the evaluation
of the act in the equation. They may exclude it because they think that
leaving it out treats equally each person’s interests in pursuing their own
acts. However, they neglect the interests that the potential harmed have in
not being subject to non-compensable harm for trivial acts. Neglecting this
aspect fails to treat equally those subject to risks because it gives
individuals too wide of discretion in imposing risks on others.
B. Rights-Based Social Welfare Theory
Some may think that a social welfare test similar to what is advocated
by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell would solve the problem of trivial acts
that I leveled against narrow utilitarianism.70 In fact, Kaplow and Shavell
go to the opposite extreme. Their theory includes, insofar as it affects the
preferences of individuals, the value of anything involved in the accident
and in the administration of assigning accident costs.71 Their theory sums
up all the various preferences that are satisfied by each option of assigning
accident costs to determine which option maximizes the (weighted)
preferences of all involved. Kaplow and Shavell only exclude in their
social welfare theory under the title of ‘fairness’ those considerations that
do not affect preference satisfaction at all.72 The right espoused by the
rights-based social welfare theory would be the right to compensation for
70

Kaplow and Shavell at 52.
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harm from an act that does not comport with the social welfare regime that
maximizes utility.
A rights-based social welfare theory may seem to have a way to avoid
the problem of narrow utilitarianism in the beach enthusiasts case. Social
welfare theory does so by weighting lower the welfare from beach going
than the welfare from ambulance driving. By reducing the welfare of beach
going through weighting it differently, the precaution needed to avoid
liability for such acts is greater than required by narrow utilitarianism. So
modified, social welfare theory would still require cost-justified
precautions, but by weighting lower the beach going act than other more
valuable acts, greater precaution is required to make beach going cost
justified.
Rights-based social welfare theory is afflicted with the first problem of
rights-based theories, the problem of incompleteness. In fact, social welfare
theory fails to answer an issue key to its own formulation. That key issue is
how much should each act be weighted.73 Social welfare theory tells us to
pursue the option that gives the highest social welfare once the acts are
weighted. However, social welfare theory does not tell us how to weight
each act.74 The rights-based social welfare theory considered above has no
determinate content without some theory that persuasively weights the
factors in the function. Thus, without content, social welfare theory is not a
viable theory of assigning accident costs. To that extent, we do not need to
and are perhaps unable to consider whether the rights-based social welfare
theory has a defensible justification.
So far, I have considered rights-based theories that have their theoretical
origins in utilitarian theory but were modified to express rights-based
theories. Not surprisingly, these theories are deficient expressions of
Kantian political theory because they are incomplete or fail to evaluate the
acts involved in a persuasive or justifiable way. I will now turn to theories
that seek to express Kantian political theory as it applies to assigning
accident costs.
V. Kantian Rights-based Theories
A. Weinrib’s Corrective Justice Theory
Ernest Weinrib provides a distinctly Kantian account of tort law by
arguing that tort law’s characteristics reflect the moral dimensions of the
73
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Kantian commitment to liberty.75 Weinrib’s theory emphasizes the bilateral
nature of tort law’s institutional structure to argue that tort law’s purpose is
to right the person wronged when that wrong led to an accident.76
Regarding the central normative concern, Weinrib endorses what he
terms the “English and Commonwealth” approach to reasonable care.77 In
contrast to narrow utilitarianism, Weinrib claims that the English and
Commonwealth approach ignores “almost completely” the burden of
precaution for reducing risk.78 Instead, this approach focuses on the risk of
harm and the magnitude of the harm that is risked to determine if an actor
was negligent.79
Weinrib outlines two parts to the English and Commonwealth approach.
First, the approach determines whether the risk was reasonably foreseeable
in the sense that “there is a threshold degree of risk that a reasonable person
ought not to ignore.”80 Only if this threshold is met does the English and
Commonwealth approach address the burden of the precaution issue,
according to Weinrib, although the details of this aspect need not concern
us. Second, if the risk exceeds the threshold degree of risk that a reasonable
person ought not to ignore, “it is then for the tribunal of fact to determine
what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk.”81 In other
words, the trial court determines whether the risky act was reasonable to
take under the circumstances.
While Weinrib provides criteria for analyzing the concept of reasonable
care, he does not offer enough criteria. His theory does not offer
determinate answers to specific cases to the central normative concern. At
both steps in the English and Commonwealth approach, Weinrib leaves
some form of the term ‘reasonable’ in the criteria. Weinrib does not tell us
either how much risk meets the initial threshold for it to be unreasonable to
ignore or how to determine that amount of risk. He also does not tell us
how a tribunal should decide whether a risky act that passed the first-stage
threshold was reasonable or not. In the end, Weinrib’s theory contains a
gap. Weinrib needs to fill this gap to have a determinate theory of assigning
accidents.
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Like the rights-based social welfare theory, Weinrib’s theory suffers
from the problem of incompleteness. Without being complete, we need not
and cannot assess its justification for how it addresses the central normative
concern. Hence, Weinrib’s theory does not provide an adequate rightsbased theory of assigning accident costs.
B. Ripstein’s Freedom and Security
Arthur Ripstein advances a theory of responsibility for accident costs
within Kantian political theory.82 He seems to be focusing exclusively on
explaining and justifying tort law as found in its extant institutional
setting.83 For my purposes, I focus only on the part of his theory about what
constitutes the standard of care for negligence in tort law, which is roughly
the same issue as the central normative concern. Ripstein argues that
determining negligence involves “weighing liberty against security” within
the construct of the reasonable person. For Ripstein, the reasonable person
“moderates his or her actions in light of the legitimate claims of others.”84
However, Ripstein does not state how to weigh liberty against security
or what specifically are the legitimate claims of others. He uses phrases
such as “appropriate care”85 to describe the amount of precaution needed
and “undue risk” to describe a risk that inappropriately weighs liberty
against security. Yet, he never fleshes out the details of what is appropriate
care or what is undue risk, seeming to leave such decisions to courts
without further guidance.86
At one point, Ripstein states, “specific liberty interests and security
interests are protected, based on a conception of their importance to leading
an autonomous life.”87 However, Ripstein does not provide us that
conception. Furthermore, it is not clear how reasoning about the
importance of liberty and security interests to autonomy is going to get us
enough detail to make the highly detailed decisions about whether acts, that
Ripstein describes as “activities in contexts,” are reasonable.88 Later,
Ripstein does point out that customary risks will often coincide with
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appropriate risks and undue risks.89 However, he does not flesh out the
importance of this coincidence or how to determine when customary risks
do not coincide with appropriate risks.
As a result, Ripstein’s theory does not go far enough in addressing the
central normative concern. Ripstein adds something to the reasonable
person theory by pointing out two key interests that concern the reasonable
person. However, he does not provide enough criteria to determine how
these further interests of security and liberty are to be justifiably weighed.
Thus, Ripstein’s theory lacks the specificity needed to determine the actual
results of how to justifiably assign costs of particular accidents. Due to the
incompleteness of Ripstein’s theory, it does not offer a viable rights-based
theory on the issue of the central normative concern.
On behalf of Ripstein, we could try to fill out how to trade off the
interests of security and liberty by appealing to moral intuition or to ideal or
actual deliberative procedures. The appeal to moral intuition to fill out the
balancing of the interests of security and liberty is unsatisfying because it
does not solve the problem of when moral intuitions conflict within an
individual and between individuals. Moral intuition is also problematic
because it seems to reify the status quo view of risks under the auspices of
objective moral truth.
If Ripstein’s theory were to spell out how the reasonable person would
balance liberty and security by appealing to actual deliberative procedures,
his theory would gain the specificity needed. However, under such an
interpretation, Ripstein’s identification of liberty and security does not seem
to add much to a theory that uses actual deliberative procedures especially
when these procedures could include more values than liberty and security.
If Ripstein’s theory were fleshed out in terms of ideal deliberative
procedures, such is difficult to evaluate without a concrete theory before us.
General values such as liberty and security do not obviously lead to any
particular conclusions about concrete risks. Spelling out how to balance
interests of security and liberty in an ideal deliberative procedure seems
unable to provide enough detail without a substantial addition of content to
the theory.
As a result, we have no persuasive way to fix the incompleteness of
Ripstein’s theory. Like the other incomplete theories above, we need not
and cannot assess the justification for Ripstein’s theory. So far, none of the
rights-based theories considered provide an adequate answer to the central
normative concern.
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C. Fletcher’s Reciprocal Risk Theory
George Fletcher claims that Kantian political theory would accord each
person the maximum amount of security compatible with the same amount
of security for everyone else.90 In this claim, Fletcher is trying to follow
John Rawls’s emphasis on reciprocity.91 So, I refer to Fletcher’s theory as
‘reciprocal risk theory.’ Put abstractly, if person X in a given interaction
imposes more risk on person Y than person Y is imposing on X (in other
words, if their mutual risk imposition is asymmetrical), then person X (the
person imposing the greater risk) owes compensation to person Y if harm
occurs. Fletcher thinks that according each individual reciprocal security
(and risk) in this manner treats individuals as free and equal.
I think that reciprocal risk theory embodies a tension. Stephen Perry
identifies this tension while pursuing a different tack, to wit, a theory of
outcome responsibility.92 To make this tension more explicit, I argue that
reciprocal risk theory has two conflicting components. The first component
compares the magnitude of the risks of each party’s act to assign accident
costs. The party that imposed the greater amount of risk on the other is
liable for any harm that occurred to the other party.93 I call this ‘component
A’ of reciprocal risk theory.
Component A is the most obvious from Fletcher’s text. Component A
explains why strict liability is used for excessively risky acts such as crop
dusting and blasting. The magnitude of the risks of these acts virtually
always exceeds the risks of the acts of those harmed. Fletcher also uses
component A to determine negligence liability when two people are
engaged in the same kind of act.94 He writes, “Negligently created risks are
nonreciprocal relative to the risks generated by the drivers and ballplayers
who engage in the same activity in the customary way.”95 All parties are
not negligent when they engage in the same act in the ordinary way, such as
when they are engaged in “ordinary driving.”96 Thus, component A can
explain pockets of strict liability if one individual is engaged in a drastically
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more risky act as well as negligence if individuals are engaged in the same
act.97
‘Component B’ of the reciprocal risk theory is hard to disentangle from
Fletcher’s writing because Fletcher sees component A and component B as
overlapping or virtually the same. Since I see component B as distinct and
in tension with component A, I must convincingly extricate it from
Fletcher’s writing.
Component B involves Fletcher’s idea of background risks.98
Background risks are all of the risks that accompany daily social life.99
Fletcher includes in reciprocal risk theory how courts should assign costs
from acts that are part of the background risk.100 Since everyone creates
background risks, Fletcher thinks, “all members of the community
contribute in roughly equal shares.”101 Recall Fletcher believes in the
“principle of fairness: all individuals in society have the right to roughly the
same degree of security from risk.”102 Since fairness or reciprocity
demands that everyone get the same amount of security, Fletcher reasons
that no one needs to be compensated when an accident results from
background risks.103 Background risks are the risks that individuals must
bear without compensation “as part of group living.”104
Fletcher provides an example, “If we all drive, we must suffer the costs
of ordinary driving.”105 From this example, we see that background risks
are acts that all (or perhaps most) people do in the manner that all (or most)
people do them. Component B is used when two parties to an accident are
engaged in different kinds of acts that are both background risks.
Component B does not look at whether one party actually imposed greater
risk on the other. Instead, since both acts are background risks, their actual
degrees of risk are not examined. Component B considers them as having
the same level of risk for the purpose of assigning accident costs (even if in
reality one background risk was riskier than the other). Since the risk
imposition is symmetrical, neither party owes the other compensation.
I contend that component A of reciprocal risk theory is in tension with
component B. Component A assigns accident costs based on the actual risk
97
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imposed by the acts. In contrast, component B ignores the actual risks of
the acts and instead assigns accident costs based on what role (common or
uncommon) that kind of act plays in the society. Thus, the two components
to reciprocal risk theory use different criteria to assign accident costs.
The result of these two components of reciprocal risk theory using
different criteria is that they may assign accident costs differently for the
same case. For example, suppose a person engaged in ordinary driving gets
into an accident with a person engaged in ordinary walking.106 Component
A would require the ordinary driver to compensate the ordinary walker
because the former imposed a comparatively higher risk on the latter.
However, component B would not require compensation from either party
because both were engaged in background risks. Thus, the problem with
reciprocal risk theory is that it has two components that assign accident
costs in conflicting ways.
Fletcher may first respond by claiming that component A and
component B actually overlap such that there is no tension between them.
The key passage states, “If uncommon activities are those with few
participants, they are likely to be activities generating nonreciprocal
risks.”107
Fletcher thinks that the domain of uncommon acts (nonbackground risks) will be coextensive with acts that are an order of
magnitude of risk different from common risks. Stating the overlap from
the other direction, Fletcher writes,
Similarly, dangerous activities like blasting, fumigating, and crop
dusting stand out as distinct, nonreciprocal risks in the community.
They represent threats of harm that exceed the level of risk to which
all members of the community contribute in roughly equal shares.108
So, component A is all that Fletcher seems to want to use. Since
nonreciprocal risks impose an uncommon amount of risk, all nonreciprocal
risks are in that sense non-background risks. In sum, for Fletcher, since
uncommon risks are coextensive with nonreciprocal risks and common risks
are coextensive with reciprocal risks, then the two components I identify
collapse into component A, which compares the actual risks of the acts to
assign accident costs.
In response to Fletcher’s attempt to unify component A and component
B, I only need to show that component A does not handle adequately at
least some accidents involving two background risks. These cases involve
106
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two acts that are both common and one clearly imposes more risk on the
other (in the sense important to component A).
Return to the case of the ordinary walker and ordinary driver.109
Ordinary driving imposes a greater risk than ordinary walking indicating
that component A would determine that the ordinary driver should
compensate the ordinary walker. However, ordinary driving and ordinary
walking are both background risks. In such cases, component B requires
that neither party owes the other compensation. To arrive at that conclusion
component A would have to ignore the obvious disparity in the risks of
these ordinary acts. But, ignoring such goes against the motivating idea
behind component A. So, reciprocal risk theory requires two conflicting
assignments of costs for the same accident.
In a footnote, Fletcher mentions the case of the ordinary walker and
driver. He states that these cases “require further thought.”110 Fletcher
thinks that these cases do not pose a significant problem because they are at
the “fringes” of reciprocal risk theory.111
These cases seem hardly at the fringes. The numbers of accidents that
result from people engaging in common acts involving significantly
different amounts of risk are numerous. Even if only some of these
common acts with different risks have as large of a disparity of risk as
driving and walking, Fletcher does not tell us why we should ignore smaller
differences.
In reality, common acts have risks that are large (driving), medium
(bicycling), and small (walking). Although cumbersome, even more
realistic would be recognizing that background risks lie on a continuum
from most risky to least risky. If Fletcher wants all individuals to have the
same amount of security, we should be concerned about making these
distinctions even if the acts are common or ordinary. If so, then the types of
accidents resulting from two ordinary acts with different amounts of risk are
not “fringe” cases that can be saved for later. Instead, they are going to
comprise a significant portion of accidents. If reciprocal risk theory
addresses these cases, it swallows the tension I have identified between
component A and component B. If reciprocal risk theory does not address
these cases, then it is unable to completely handle all kinds of accidents.
Furthermore, there are cases where uncommon acts are not riskier than
common acts. Suppose that a person is sword swallowing when she gets
into an accident with an ordinary walker. While sword swallowing is
109
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dangerous for the individual doing the swallowing, this uncommon act does
not seem more harmful to other people than walking or many other
common acts.
In such a case, we see a tension in reciprocal risk theory. Component A
would determine no liability based on the similarity of risks to others
between sword swallowing and ordinary walking. However, since sword
swallowing is uncommon, it would not be a background risk indicating that
the sword swallower should compensate the ordinary walker. The way to
explain these diverging liability determinations is by acknowledging the
two components of reciprocal risk theory. At the same time, we see that
these two components are in tension because they lead to two conflicting
ways to assign accident costs for the same case.
One way to resolve this tension is for reciprocal risk theory to assign
each component to distinct kinds of accidents. The tension would not arise
because the two components would never be applied to the same kind of
accident. While such a resolution would eliminate the tension between the
two components in reciprocal risk theory, I see no way to justify assigning
component A exclusively to certain kinds of acts while assigning
component B exclusively to different kinds of acts.
Another possible resolution to the tension is to make component B
concerned with actual risk over complete lives rather than about the specific
acts that lead to an accident. Fletcher seems to suggest that if Jack walks
while Jill bicycles one day, they are in a reciprocal relationship because
another day Jill walks and Jack bicycles.112 Or, even if Jack does not
bicycle, he may do some other act that imposes the same level of risk on Jill
such as playing football.113 By not requiring compensation for all acts that
are background risks, component B focuses on individuals imposing
(roughly) the same amount of risk on each other over complete lives.
Under this resolution, both components of reciprocal risk theory are
concerned about actual risk but they differ on the timeframe in which they
measure actual risk. Component A looks only at the acts that lead to the
accident in question whereas component B looks at the aggregate risk over
a complete life to balance out disparities in discrete cases of risk imposition.
The first problem with this attempt at resolving the tension is that the
two components still would conflict with each other on whether to require
liability in specific cases. Without independent reasons to treat an accident
as one where we should take the lifelong view versus the immediate view,
112
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the two components would still recommend different assignments of
accident costs in some cases.
The lifelong approach to assigning accident costs (a supposed version of
component B) is an appealing interpretation of Fletcher because it coheres
well with the Rawlsian rationale that animates his theory. Recall that
rationale is that each person is to be guaranteed equal amounts of
security.114 Compensation makes up for a person’s loss of security when
they are harmed thereby restoring them to an equal amount of security as
everyone else.
The problem with this resolution is that component A and component B
are supposed to justify a legal duty for one person to compensate another
person for a single harmful act. As Stephen Perry points out, the bilateral
nature of this legal duty conflicts with the rationale that motivates Fletcher’s
reciprocal risk theory (and my supposed version of component B).115 If
compensation makes up for a loss of security, we would expect all
individuals who engaged in a kind of risky act to compensate a person
harmed not merely the one individual whose risky act happened to harm the
person.116 A rationale that seeks to distribute security equally would be
better suited to social tort insurance where the cost of compensating for loss
of security (harm) is distributed among all individuals who risk others’ loss
of security.117 So, the attempt to save Fletcher from the tension between
component A and component B by taking a lifelong view of risk does not
mesh with much of Fletcher’s text where he is trying to establish an
individual’s duty to another individual to compensate for harm.
The final problem of reformulating the reciprocal risk theory in terms of
a lifelong distribution of equal security or risk among persons stems from
the fact that component B does not guarantee that each individual will be
exposed to even roughly the same amount of risk over her complete life.
The reason is that not every individual engages in the same variety of acts
to the same extent. So, just because component B allows one person to
perform the same acts (background risks) as others does not mean that each
person will be subject to roughly the same amount of risk over a complete
life. The problem is that Uday always walks and may never do an act that
counterbalances Jill’s bicycling or Jack’s football playing. Even if Uday
does some comparable act, he may not do it as often as others do their
riskier acts because he spends most of his time inside his house.
Additionally, one person’s background risk act can kill another person
114
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cutting off that person’s chance to impose risks on others to counterbalance
the risk to which he was subjected.
Component B merely gives each person the formal or legal freedom to
do the same acts without being assigned others’ costs from any harm.
Component B does not guarantee that everyone will be subjected to and
able to subject others to roughly the same amount of risk because individual
preferences may lead them to consistently impose different levels of risk on
each other. We have no reason to believe that the differences would cancel
out as we add more people into the equation. Thus, reciprocal risk theory
does not seem to equalize actual risks over complete lives. So, this attempt
to reconcile the tension between the two components of reciprocal risk
theory fails.
Since the tension remains, reciprocal risk theory needs to pick between
component A and component B. My guess is that Fletcher would pick
component A and reject component B because component A most explicitly
employs reciprocity, the value that Fletcher thinks animates his theory of
tort law.
At most, component B provides ‘legal reciprocity’ in that everyone is
subject to the same legal rules. However, almost any plausible regime of
assigning accident costs will have legal reciprocity as long as accident costs
are assigned based on the actions performed. To that extent, component B
of reciprocal risk theory cannot claim to embody any unique form of
reciprocity compared to all other regimes of assigning accident costs.
Perhaps Fletcher does not think of the reciprocity in component B as
legal reciprocity. Rather, perhaps he thinks that background risks are
reciprocal because the society accepts these risks as part of the hazards of
their way of living. The reciprocity is that all members somehow have
agreed that these risks are acceptable in that society. While this
interpretation is appealing, I see only minimal textual basis in Fletcher’s
work that hints in this direction.
Furthermore, a plausible conception of reciprocity based on agreement
to a regime of risk does not seem open to Fletcher because he does not place
any requirements on how the accepted regime of background risks is
established. If background risks are just what individuals do on a consistent
basis, then stronger individuals or special interest groups would be able to
unfairly impose their preferred risks as part of the background risks. If
others have no say in what risks others can impose, not only is an agreement
on the regime of risks unlikely but also reciprocity seems nowhere to be
found. Since Fletcher does not have limitations on the way that background
risks are determined in a society, he does not seem to establish that
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component B is justified by a form reciprocity based on agreement on
acceptable risks.
Even if Fletcher goes this direction with component B, the tension still
exists between component A and component B (and mere legal reciprocity).
The new interpretation of component B rests on most individuals in a
community agreeing in some sense to a certain regime of risks. Component
A does not appeal to any sense of agreement since it only looks at whether
individuals actually impose the same risks on each other. Since a
community can agree that unequal risk impositions of certain kinds should
be free from liability, the tension between component B with this new
interpretation and component A of reciprocal risk theory remains.
No other plausible interpretation of component B seems to be able to
employ the same sense of reciprocity as component A. So, in the end,
Fletcher equivocates on reciprocity in component A and in component B.
Since I take Fletcher to primarily be advocating for the sense of reciprocity
imbued in component A of reciprocal risk theory, I conclude that Fletcher
would excise component B.
Unfortunately, component A by itself is not an appealing theory of
assigning accident costs. One measurement problem with such a theory is
that we do not have a persuasive way to compare the magnitude of risks
between different acts when those risks are not clearly far apart on the risk
spectrum. Whether walking while texting is riskier than playing Frisbee is
difficult to tell.
A bigger problem is that assigning accident costs according to
component A alone provides uncertainty. Whether one person is acting
safely enough to avoid being assigned another’s accident costs depends on
what the other person who happens to be harmed is doing. A standard of
care that is such a moving target would make it difficult for individuals to
plan appropriately including buying appropriate levels of insurance. Such a
regime would burden individuals’ freedom to engage in acts they deem
valuable. Thus, component A alone does not seem to be a good
interpretation of what it means to treat a person as free according to Kantian
political morality.
Component A alone would also favor individuals who prefer acts with
low risk. Individuals with low risk preferences would likely be able to get
the costs of their accidents assigned to the other person involved in the
accident. Such an advantage for individuals with low risk preferences does
not treat persons as equal according to Kantian political morality.
In summary, Fletcher’s theory of reciprocal risk is inadequate either
because its parts conflict or because its foremost part (component A) is not
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a satisfying interpretation of Kantian political theory. Reciprocal risk
theory does not provide us with an adequate rights-based theory of
assigning accident costs.
D. Perry’s Accepted Pattern of Social Interaction
In critiquing Fletcher’s theory, Stephen Perry suggests his own theory of
assigning accident costs. He writes, “the materialization of a risk that is
normally incident to an accepted pattern of social interaction will not give
rise to liability.”118 By this statement, Perry means that if an act of an
individual accidentally harms another individual, the former does not have
to compensate the latter as long as the former’s act is part of an accepted
pattern of social interaction. Unfortunately, Perry does not flesh out what
he means by an ‘accepted pattern of social interaction.’
Depending on how Perry fleshes out his theory, this theory may in fact
accurately describe accident law doctrine.119 Regardless, Perry seems to
suggest that he is also advancing a normative theory.120 For my purposes, I
will assess Perry’s theory as a normative theory because only as such does it
address the central normative concern.
Although Perry’s theory can be a normative theory, he does not offer a
justification for that theory. Given that Perry suggests his theory while
discussing Fletcher’s theory and as a possible amendment to Fletcher’s
theory, I think it is safe to assume that Perry thinks his theory is justified
within the Kantian rights-based tradition. However, I do not think that
Perry is relying on Fletcher’s principle about ensuring everyone equal
security because Perry criticizes Fletcher’s use of what seems to be a
principle of social distributive justice to establish a right in corrective
justice to determine a right that would pertain only between the two parties
in an accident.121 For Perry’s theory to be persuasive, we need a more
detailed justification than a vague appeal to Kantian rights. I will consider
two possible justifications below.
Before then, I identify some possible problems internal to Perry’s
theory. Perry’s theory has one of the problems I identified while trying to
resolve the tension in Fletcher’s theory: an accepted pattern of social
interaction may not be justifiable for assigning accident costs because of the
118
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way the pattern became accepted. For example, if the society accepted an
aspect of a pattern of interaction due to fraud, then the pattern is not a
justifiable basis for assigning accident costs. The fraudulent aspect of the
pattern means that the pattern was not legitimately accepted. Reading Perry
charitably, we could assume that he too would invalidate aspects of a social
pattern that were the result of fraud. If so, then Perry needs to complete his
theory by stating how to assign accident costs where the relevant part of the
accepted pattern of social interaction is invalidated by fraud.
Another problem with Perry’s theory (also identified above with
Fletcher) is that an accepted pattern of social interaction could violate
constitutional rights. For instance, the accepted pattern of social interaction
could violate the equal protection clause as it applies to race or sex. As
pictured in the recent movie The Help, the accepted pattern of social
interaction prohibited African American domestic workers from entering
the house where they worked through the front door.122 If an African
American domestic worker slipped and fell while entering the front door of
her employment, her violating the accepted social pattern may exonerate the
homeowner/employer from being assigned the costs of the worker’s harm.
Such a legal implication would violate the domestic worker’s constitutional
right to be free from racial discrimination.
Perry may also endorse that the accepted pattern must not violate
constitutional rights to be legitimate as a friendly amendment. Once again,
he needs to spell out how to handle these sorts of cases for his theory to be
complete and persuasive.
Aside from these amendments for Perry’s accepted pattern theory to be
persuasive, potential problems lurk for Perry’s theory depending on how he
fleshes the theory out. The problems concern the two attributes of the
social interaction. Perry requires the social interaction to be both accepted
and a pattern in some sense. Both of these attributes pose difficulties. First,
Perry must not mean to require unanimous acceptance. Requiring that
everyone accept the pattern dooms the standard to being impossible to
satisfy. If not unanimity, how many must accept the pattern for it to be
legally justified? If only a majority of the members of the society need to
accept the pattern, how does that acceptance justify assigning accident costs
to an individual who does not accept the pattern?
Moving on, another problem concerns the nature of the acceptance of
the pattern. By ‘accepted’ does Perry require a conscious, deliberate
avowal of the social interaction? Such a stringent requirement may be too
high to apply in accident cases because often many individuals in a society
122
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do not consciously and deliberately consider whether to accept acts that
could lead to harm. At least, Perry must require that many people to have a
pro-attitude toward the pattern of social interaction. What about those who
are indifferent or undecided? What if 50% of the population has a proattitude toward one pattern and the other 50% has a pro-attitude toward a
mutually exclusive pattern? Without answering these issues, Perry’s theory
is incomplete.
Potential difficulties lurk depending on what Perry means by the second
attribute ‘pattern.’ Since Perry is speaking of what individuals are doing, he
seems to mean by ‘pattern’ what individuals are actually doing with some
sort of regularity. One difficulty concerns the conflict between these two
attributes: ‘accepted’ and ‘pattern.’ The actual pattern of social interaction
could not be accepted, or the pattern that most people accept is not being
done. Suppose most individuals believe that drivers should not phone while
driving. Yet, most individuals including those with this belief actually
phone while driving. If harm results from such a scenario, Perry’s theory
provides no answer to how to assign accident costs.
Another difficulty with Perry’s use of ‘pattern’ concerns acts that are
not done uniformly. For example, suppose 15% of homeowners remove
litter from their walkways daily, 40% do so weekly, 40% bi-weekly, and
5% monthly or less frequently. Is this complicated arrangement the pattern
of social interaction? If so, then no one ever deviates from the pattern.
Suppose someone were to slip and fall on litter on the walkway of a house
whose homeowner removes litter bi-weekly. If no one is deviating from the
(complicated, non-uniform pattern), then the homeowner whose walkway
led to the accident met the extremely low or nonexistent standard of care.
Pedestrians would have to walk at their own risk. This is a curious outcome
given that 55% of the homeowners remove their litter at least weekly.
To avoid this problem, perhaps, Perry could appeal to which frequency
for litter removal is accepted. However, how people actually act is strong
evidence of what they accept. So, how would we determine if one of these
frequencies is the accepted pattern of social interaction when what people
are doing reflects no majority consensus?
It is possible that Perry could flesh out his theory in a way that satisfies
these concerns. But, these concerns remain until his theory is fleshed out.
Many of the concerns I have raised against Perry’s theory need to be
answered by the theory that I will sketch below. However, I believe that
my theory persuasively answers these concerns, as I will demonstrate in a
future piece.
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Even if Perry can persuasively satisfy these concerns, we still lack a
detailed justification for Perry’s theory. Why should the accepted pattern of
social interaction be the criterion for assigning accident costs?
As mentioned earlier, Perry may be committed to a Kantian, rightsbased justification for his accepted pattern theory of assigning accident
costs. One possible version of that justification is suggested by the way
Perry formulates his theory. If certain acts are being done in a pattern,
individuals have reason to rely on each other conforming to that pattern.123
This reason is especially strong for acts where the benefits of the acts
depend largely on everyone conforming to the pattern such as in traffic
patterns. Given that reliance on the pattern is reasonable (perhaps rational)
or at least understandable, someone who deviates from that pattern (a
deviator) wrongs another individual who is harmed by the deviating act.
This assumes that the harmed individual was conforming to the pattern of
social cooperation. While not identical, the harmed’s reliance interest in the
pattern of social interaction is similar to the reliance interest an individual
may acquire in the realm of contract law when one relies on another’s
promise despite the lack of contractual consideration. The reliance on the
pattern of social interaction seems even stronger if the pattern is accepted
and known by everyone that it is the accepted pattern.
While the idea of reliance can provide one reason why an accepted
pattern of social interaction is a plausible basis for assigning accident costs,
I do not think the justification runs deep enough into our considered
convictions of how society should be organized to support the entire system
of assigning accident costs. The reliance justification does not seem to be
able to combat the reasoning of a deviator who acts for a different yet
laudable reason. Suppose someone deviates from an accepted pattern of
social interaction because doing so produces more utility. The deviator
claims that producing more utility justifies deviation while the harmed
claims that reliance on the accepted pattern delegitimizes deviation. The
reliance theorist does not seem to have a response; the reliance theorist
needs a more robust theory in order to overcome this possible objection by
the deviator.
Another shortcoming of the reliance justification is that it does not
explain how changes to the accepted pattern of social interaction can be
effected legitimately. If an actual pattern of social interaction is no longer
accepted, can one no longer rely on that pattern? If an accepted pattern is
no longer being followed even though it is still accepted, can one no longer
123
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rely on that pattern? Must one rely on a new, emerging pattern even though
it is not accepted? Can the government intervene to incentivize one pattern
over another? The reliance justification does not seem to have robust
enough theoretical resources to provide persuasive answers to these
questions. The overarching problem in these questions is that the reliance
justification does not provide justifiable mechanisms for the formation or
change of accepted patterns of social interactions.
Another possible version of a Kantian rights-based justification for
Perry’s theory could be arguing that free and equal individuals in a society
would choose the accepted pattern theory as fair terms of social
cooperation. In Perry’s accepted pattern theory, individuals are free to
engage in whatever act they wish. As long as their act is part of the
accepted pattern of social interaction, individuals do not have to bear any
accident costs of others that result from their acts. Individuals are equal,
one could argue, in that each individual gets to participate in the accepted
pattern of social interaction. Accident costs are not assigned based on
attributes of the individual but rather based on the individual’s acts. If one
individual deviates from the pattern and harms another, the deviator is
assigned the accident costs of the individual that did not deviate from the
accepted pattern. One could argue that the accepted pattern provides a
realm of equality by setting the standard for assigning accident costs in this
way.
Perry’s theory may obtain freedom and equality of individuals to some
extent. However, I do not think that it is the best interpretation of Kantian
political theory. Concerning treating persons as free, while individuals are
free to participate in the accepted pattern of social interaction under Perry’s
theory, they are not free to deviate from the accepted pattern without risking
being assigned the costs of anyone accidentally harmed by their deviation.
The accepted pattern of social interaction could encompass a wide swathe
of acts or it could be narrow. Since Perry places no requirements on the
breadth of the accepted pattern, the amount of freedom to act without
risking liability may be large or small depending on what the accepted
pattern is. Individuals who see themselves as free would likely want an
alternative arrangement than Perry’s theory in order to protect their freedom
as much as fair terms of social cooperation allow.
Another shortcoming for Perry’s theory is that it does not explain how
those who do not accept the ‘accepted pattern’ are treated as either free or
equal. Recall that Perry’s theory cannot require everyone to accept every
aspect of the ‘accepted pattern of social interaction.’ Doing so would risk
requiring too high of a standard that no actual pattern could meet. Thus,
some individuals in the society do not accept the accepted pattern of social
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interaction. Let’s call them ‘dissenters.’ Dissenters may be free like
everyone else to act in accordance with the accepted pattern of social
interaction without being subject to liability. However, they are likely
powerless to alter an aspect of the accepted pattern given that they have a
minority view on that aspect. Those that accept the accepted pattern of
social interaction (‘accepters’) may also, as individuals, be powerless to
change the pattern. However, the powerlessness of the accepters does not
seem problematic because they accept the pattern whereas the
powerlessness of the dissenters appears more problematic. At least,
explaining how the dissenters are just as free as the accepters needs to be
worked out.
Even if dissenters are just as free (in some sense) as the accepters, the
dissenters do not seem to be treated as equals with the acceptors. The
accepted pattern of social interaction does not seem to value the dissenters’
interests on an issue to the same extent as it values the accepters’ interests.
The difference in value results from the different treatment when assigning
accident costs. Acts that involve the differing interests of the dissenters are
subject to liability if another is harmed whereas the acts that involve the
interests of the accepters are not subject to liability if another is harmed. If
both dissenters and acceptors were to act according to their respective
interests, dissenters would bear more risk of being assigned others’ accident
costs than the accepters would bear. On face, dissenters do not seem to be
treated as equals. Therefore, Perry’s theory does not seem to treat persons
as equal to a significant extent as required by Kantian political theory.
It is true that Perry’s theory treats everyone as equals in that the same
standard for assigning accident costs is applied to everyone in the same
way. However, as I pointed out earlier, every plausible theory of assigning
accident costs has this virtue because each theory would apply the same
standard to everyone.
Since Perry’s accepted pattern theory is incomplete and insufficiently
justified, the question remains whether another theory of assigning accident
costs better captures Kantian political theory. In the final section, I briefly
outline a theory that answers the central normative concern. This theory
could offer the best interpretation of Kantian political theory compared to
any of the extant theories of assigning accident costs.
VI. Democratic Community Standard Theory
I offer what I call ‘democratic community standard theory’ as the best
interpretation of Kantian political theory and as the most persuasive answer
to the central normative concern. While a complete defense of democratic
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community standard theory must await another time, I sketch its main
features.124
In democratic community standard theory, the community’s evaluations
of risk establish a threshold of risk for each kind of act. Putting this theory
in terms of the central normative concern, the community’s evaluation of
risk should determine the amount of precaution an individual must employ
to avoid being justifiably assigned others’ costs from an accident.
The community’s evaluation of a risk is determined by how the majority
of the members in the community evaluate the kind of risk in question. If
one performs an act above the threshold of risk for that kind of act, then one
has violated the democratic community standard. Violating the democratic
community standard means that one is subject to being assigned any
resulting accident costs of others. As long as one’s act is at or below the
community’s threshold of risk, one has met the democratic community
standard. Having met the democratic community standard means that one
should not be assigned others’ accident costs. Democratic community
standard theory provides a transparent and complete assignment of accident
costs preferable to Weinrib’s vague reliance on the concept of reasonable.
The democratic community standard is comprised (in most cases) of the
community’s actual evaluations of risk. In this way, democratic community
standard theory bears a resemblance to one possible interpretation of
component B of Fletcher’s reciprocal risk theory where background risks
are the risks that a community accepts as part of daily life.
Furthermore, recall that I pointed out a conception of component B
based on agreement to a regime of risk does not seem open to Fletcher for
three reasons. First, such an interpretation is still in tension with component
A of reciprocal risk theory because it does not look at the details of the
background risks to assign accident costs.
Second, Fletcher does not place any requirements on how the
background risks are formed. If background risks were just what
individuals do on a consistent basis, then individuals that are more powerful
or special interest groups would be able to unfairly impose their preferred
risks as part of the background risks. In democratic community standard
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Democratic community standard theory need not and (in my view) does not apply to
all accidents. For example, for individuals living with mental illness or low mental ability,
I think the accident costs should be handled according to social tort insurance, as I argue in
a separate piece (on file with the author). In my view, democratic community standard
theory does not apply to accidents involving commercial and governmental acts. Rather,
the theory is part of a comprehensive Kantian approach to accidents that I will articulate in
a future piece.
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theory, the community’s actual evaluations of risk would only be
invalidated if they were based on fraud, violated constitutional rights, or
like.
Finally, a theory that assigns accident costs based on community
acceptance of risk does not fit with Fletcher’s justificatory principle.
Reciprocity does not seem to be the driving justification for an
interpretation of background risks based on community acceptance of risk.
Since one person could be harmed extensively by others engaged in
background risks without receiving compensation, it is a stretch to say that
he reciprocally enjoys the same security as others.
Instead, what seems to be doing the normative work is that the
individual’s freedom to pursue her life plan is balanced against others’
ability to do the same. In this process, no one is guaranteed the same
amount of security. Some will get more than others depending on their life
plans and their luck. However, individuals are counted equally in
determining the democratic community standard. Even if community
acceptance of a regime of risk is what Fletcher means by background risks,
then democratic community standard theory places this theory on its proper
normative justification, namely, democracy.
Having distinguished democratic community standard theory from the
concept of background risks, I address where the community’s evaluations
of risk are found. The community’s actual evaluations of risk can be found
in the beliefs and practices of that community. Examples of such sources
include social norms, regular patterns of behavior, conventions, customs,
moral beliefs, community-endorsed laws, beliefs about common sense, and
so on. In this way, democratic community standard theory differs from
Perry’s accepted pattern theory. Perry’s theory uses ‘accepted patterns of
social cooperation’ as criteria for assigning accident costs. In contrast,
democratic community standard theory uses the community’s evaluations of
risks as criteria for assigning accident costs. An accepted pattern of social
cooperation is a possible piece of evidence for the community’s evaluation
of a risk, but it is not determinative. The accepted pattern is rebuttable if
other sources of the community’s evaluation of the risk more strongly
support another threshold of risk.
Returning to the phoning while driving example, if phoning while
driving is a pattern of behavior that is accepted (in some sense), phoning
while driving could still fall below the community’s evaluation of risk,
according to democratic community standard theory, if a traffic law against
phoning while driving was recently passed according to acceptable
democratic procedures. Hence, other beliefs and practices in addition to an
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‘accepted pattern’ are evidence for the community’s evaluation of risk in
democratic community standard theory.
In using these various beliefs and practices as evidence of the
community’s evaluations of risk (i.e., the democratic community standard),
communities are able to combine and trade-off values according to the
relative weight they attach to each value.125 In this way, the democratic
community standard embodies the multiple values of the community
weighted by the community rather than a single value such as efficiency or
values foreign to the community. By providing a concrete mechanism to
trade-off multiple important values, democratic community standard theory
provides what is missing from Ripstein’s theory of freedom and equality.
Recall that social welfare theory was incomplete because it lacked a
way to weight the values of acts. Democratic community standard theory
provides a way to weight and trade-off values that furthers the values of the
community. Democratic community standard theory also solves one
problem with narrow utilitarianism by allowing a community to prevent
individuals from being exposed to liability from others’ trivial acts. Those
who engage in trivial acts according to the democratic community standard
are subject to being assigned any resulting accident costs.
Within each community, democratic community standard theory does
not require that the community have a threshold of risk above zero for each
kind of act. The democratic community standard need not always absolve
the agent from liability if she meets a threshold level of risk. The
community evaluations of risk could be such that no amount of precaution
is sufficient to absolve an individual of being assigned any resulting
accident costs. The comparison here is with the tort doctrine of strict
liability.
The community evaluations of risk could have the same effect as strict
liability for particular kinds of acts for a number of reasons. The
community could not value a kind of act that much. The community could
be adverse to the kinds of harms that can result from a kind of act. The
community could think that certain kinds of acts are more prone to accident.
The community may think certain kinds of acts are only worthwhile if such
kinds of acts pay for the harms they cause. The benefit of a kind of act
could largely go to one segment of the community while the risks of harm
largely affect a separate segment of the community. For these and other
possible reasons, the community could prefer that individuals engaged in
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See also, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law
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certain risky kinds of acts be assigned the costs of any accidents regardless
of the precaution employed.
Consequently, democratic community standard theory harmonizes the
normative criteria for the two standards of care in tort doctrine, negligence
and strict liability. Since the community evaluation of a risk is the sole
criterion for assigning accident costs, using the negligence standard or strict
liability should involve determining the community's evaluation of the risk
of the kind of act in question. So, whether to use the negligence standard or
strict liability for a particular accident would not be based on judicial
discretion or precedent. By only using one criterion for assigning accident
costs democratic community standard theory provides a more theoretically
harmonious theory than the reasonable person theory with its unexplained
side-kick strict liability.
Earlier I identified an ambiguity in the reasonable person standard
theory regarding the scope of the society or community; the theory did not
say whether the city, state, country or other group filled out the
requirements of the reasonable person. To avoid having that ambiguity,
democratic community standard theory uses a concept of community that is
delineated by geographical boundaries. By geographical boundaries, I do
not mean that certain features of the land separate communities. Instead, I
mean that the community is a group of people that share a section of the
Earth based on their interactions, especially the kinds of interactions that led
to the accident. As a result, democratic community standard theory does
not have one particular size of community in mind. In other words, the
community could be a neighborhood, town, a state, a nation, or even a
larger group. Instead, democratic community standard theory provides the
criterion for delineating the boundaries of the relevant community for
assigning the costs of a particular accident. The criterion is the nature of the
acts that led to the accident and what should have been the expectations of
those who were party to the accident.
To operationalize democratic community standard theory, the decisionmaker who applies the democratic community standard does not have to be
a member of the community. For instance, in the judicial setting the judge
and jury would not have to be comprised of members of the relevant
community. Instead, the plaintiff and defendant could have people from the
relevant community testify as to what the democratic community standard
is regarding the defendant’s kind of act. If jury members are from the
relevant community, then the jury instructions need to explicitly guide them
to ascertain what the community standard in their community is rather than
some religious or objective moral standard as the reasonable person theory
could suggest.
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Democratic community standard theory uses democracy in a substantive
sense rather than a procedural sense. Pure substantive democracy is mostly
interested in the content of laws rather than the procedures that produce
those laws. Democratic community standard theory’s substantive criteria
for evaluating the assignment of accident costs are the community
evaluations of risk in most cases.
Due to its use of substantive democracy, democratic community
standard theory does not require procedures that are often associated with
democracy such as voting to elect law-making officials, elected officials
voting on proposed laws, universal suffrage voting on proposed laws (i.e.
referendum), transparent elections, and so on. Let me call this sense of
democracy, where democracy is constituted primarily by some or all of
these procedures, ‘procedural democracy.’ Pure procedural democracy as a
theory about the moral justifiability of laws does not evaluate the content of
a law by an external criterion. Whatever laws are made by its procedures
are morally justifiable.
In contrast, democratic community standard theory does not require any
particular democratic procedures to make decisions about assigning
accident costs. Thus, democratic community standard theory should not be
interpreted as a theory of procedural democracy. For instance, the upshot of
democratic community standard theory is not that legislatures as opposed to
courts should be assigning accident costs. Democratic community standard
theory would endorse particular institutional mechanisms based on their
instrumental effectiveness in instantiating its substantive criteria, that is, in
assigning accident costs according to the community’s evaluations of risk.
One may raise the same concern with democratic community standard
theory that I raised with Perry’s theory: how does one determine the
democratic community standard especially when beliefs and practices vary
in a community? In such a situation, evidence for what is the majority
community evaluation of a risk may conflict. Let’s illustrate this possibility
with the example of Woomin and Eman. Suppose again that in this
community, most people believe that phoning while driving is not a
worthwhile risk as evidenced by what they say in community discussions
and how they behave when observing someone phoning while driving.
However, at the same time, a large majority of the community, including
those that believe that phoning while driving is not worthwhile, often phone
while driving themselves with little to no cognitive dissonance.
One way to address such a case is to see if we have reason to discount
one side of the conflicting evidence for the community’s evaluation of a
risk. For example, the beliefs of most individuals about how much phoning
while driving increases the likelihood of a vehicular accident may be

48

Rights-based Theories of Accident Law

erroneous. If these individuals knew how much phoning while driving
actually increases the risk of accidents, then they may change their spoken
statements about the evaluation of the risk of phoning while driving to
match their actual behavior.
Assume from now on that nothing suggests we should discount the
evidence on either side of the conflict. The community’s evaluation of the
risky kind of act is based on the most reliable information available. The
behavior that contradicts the community’s spoken evaluation of the risk is
not based on free-riding, self-deceit, or anything else that would make us
discount that behavior. If so, then evidence based on community beliefs
seems to support that phoning while driving exceeds the community’s
threshold for risk and at the same time evidence based on community
practices seems to support that phoning while driving meets the
community’s threshold for risk. Due to the conflicting evidence, it would
seem that no majority community evaluation of the risk exists.
To resolve this conflict, we should view conflicting evidence within its
historical context. If the current evidence points to equal evidence for and
against whether a risk is worthwhile, then a tie about what is the
community’s evaluation of risk should depend on the newness of the risk.
If the risk is relatively new, then without more evidence on its side the risk
should be considered above the community threshold for risk because the
community has not yet endorsed that risk. If the risk has existed for a long
time and community views are shifting about whether it is a worthwhile
risk, then the evaluation of the risk should remain wherever it was prior to
the shifting until a new view gains enough ground to provide clear evidence
that it is the majority view.
These conclusions rest on the core idea in democratic community
standard theory: the most important criterion to assigning accident costs is
whether the community has endorsed the risk. For a new risk, no clear
endorsement means that the risk is not evaluated by the community as
worthwhile. Without a clear endorsement of changes to the community’s
evaluation of a risk, the status quo should remain. In so doing, the central
normative concern is answered: A person only need to meet the democratic
community standard of risk to avoid being justifiably assigned another’s
accident costs.
VII. Conclusion
While the democratic community standard requires much more
exploration, what I have said sufficiently suggests that extant rights-based
theories are inadequate to the task of answering the central normative
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concern. To develop a compelling rights-based theory of assigning accident
costs, democratic community standard theory merits more investigation.

